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The Standing and Removal Decisions
from the Supreme Court's 2006 Term
by Steven H. Steinglass*
his article reviews some of the more
important jurisdictional decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court during the court's
2006-07 term, the first full term that
included both of the court's newest justices-Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Associate Samuel A.
Alito Jr. The term begins an era that will likely
become known as the Roberts Court, but this term
surely belonged to Associate Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote in all 24 of the
court's 5-4 decisions.
For this article, I identified six jurisdictional deci-
sions in two areas-standing and removal. I do not
discuss Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twonbly, the court's most
important pleading decision in 50 years, or its three
other pleading decisions. Nor do I discuss other
important jurisdictional and procedural decisions lim-
iting the availability of Bivens actions, limiting the
availability of punitive damages, imposing strict
appellate time limits and permitting threshold deter-
minations of forum non conveniens.
STANDING
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and
the case or controversy requirement of Article III lim-
its the business of the federal courts. The most
important of the limitations imposed directly and
indirectly by Article III is the standing requirement,
and this term included three cases on standing.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency
The biggest surprise of the term was the 5-4 decision
in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007), holding that Massachusetts had
standing to challenge the refusal of the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.
The decision was written by Justice Stevens, who was
joined by Justice Kennedy in his most significant break
with his conservative allies. Relying on the relaxed
standards of redressability and immediacy when
Congress extends procedural rights in the rule-making
process and the "special solicitude" to which states are
entitled, the court concluded that global warming (for
which gas emissions were a contributing factor) creat-
ed a risk of injury to Massachusetts that was both actu-
al and imminent. That injury-the loss of coastal land
(much of which was owned by the state)-met the ini-
tial standing inquiry, and the court further found that
the allegation that the regulation of gas emissions
would contribute to the alleviation of the injury met
the redressabiltiy standard.
Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc.
Not surprising was the Court's 5-4 decision in Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct.
2553 (2007), rejecting the availability of federal tax-
payer standing to challenge discretionary expendi-
tures made by the executive branch to support faith-
based community groups. The result of the decision
was clear, but the majority could not produce a clear
holding. The plurality opinion written by Justice
Alito (on behalf of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy) limited Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968),
to specific congressional appropriations but stated
unequivocally that it was neither extending nor over-
ruling Flast. Justice Scalia (concurring only in the
judgment and joined by Justice Thomas) agreed with
the dissenting justices that there was no meaningful
distinction between specific congressional appropria-
tions and general or discretionary allocations to the
executive branch, but that led him to conclude that
Flast should be repudiated.
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764
(2007), the most important of the standing cases for
commercial litigators, the court, in a 8-1 decision
written by Justice Scalia, held that the Article III case
or controversy requirement (which is reflected in the
"actual controversy" requirement of the Declaratory
Judgment Act) does not require a patent licensee to
terminate or be in breach of its license agreement
before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed. Relying on a line of declaratory judgment
actions involving issues of public law, the court, with
only Justice Thomas dissenting, applied these princi-
ples to voluntarily accepted contractual obligations
between private parties.
REMOVAL
Removal jurisdiction is a hot topic. Though not
mentioned in the Constitution, this basis of federal
court jurisdiction has been authorized by Congress
since the Judiciary Act of 1789 and was the subject of
three Supreme Court decisions during the 2006 term
(after having been the subject of three decisions in
the prior term).
Removal jurisdiction is designed to protect feder-
al interests by giving state court defendants the abil-
ity to remove certain civil actions to federal courts,
and they are doing so with increasing frequency.
Typically, state court defendants (other than citizens
of the forum state in diversity cases) may remove
cases that could have originally been filed in federal
court, but special removal provisions also permit
federal officers and agencies as well as foreign sover-
eigns to remove. Federal courts to which cases are
removed may remand the cases to the state courts
for defects in the removal procedures (i.e., non-
timely removals, violations of the forum defendant
rule, or violations of the rule of unanimity), for vari-
ous post-removal events (i.e., remands based on the
discretionary refusal to exercise supplemental juris-
diction or on the various abstention doctrines), or
for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finally,
to avoid protracted disputes about jurisdiction,
Congress (with some limited express exceptions)
has barred the appeal of remand orders. See 28
U.S.C. §1447(d) ("An order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise .. .
Osborn v. Haley
Federal employees have absolute immunity form tort
actions arising out of acts undertaken in the course of
their official duties. When they are sued in state
court, the Westfall Act provides that a certification by
the attorney general that the employee was acting
within the scope of his or her employment is the basis
for the removal and the substitution of the United
States as the defendant. In such actions, the attorney
general's certification is "conclusiv[e] ... for purposes
of removal." The Westfall Act, however, does not
address the availability of appellate review of remand
orders, but in a 5-4 decision written early in the term
by Justice Ginsburg the court in Osborn v. Haley, 127
S.Ct. 881 (2007), construed the competing "ant-shut-
tling" commands of § 1447(d) and the later-enacted
Westfall Act and held that the statutory bar on appel-
late review of remand orders did not apply to suits
removed under the Westfall Act.
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Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 127 S.Ct.
2411 (2007), a 7-2 decision written by Justice Scalia,
was the court's most important removal decision of
the term for reasons independent of its holding distin-
guishing Osborn and ruling that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was not an implied
exception to the bar on appellate review of remand
orders in cases against putative foreign sovereigns.
Powerex began as a complex multi-party state court
action alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in the energy
market in violation of California law. The Powerex
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of a British
Columbia crown corporation (that in turn was wholly
owned by the Province), was brought into the suit on
an indemnification theory. The subsidiary removed
the case to federal court, but the district court held
that it was not a foreign sovereign and remanded the
case and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine if the subsidiary was an "organ of a foreign state
or political division thereof' under the FSIA. If so,
the subsidiary would have been able to remove under
the special removal authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
The court, however, also asked the parties to address
whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction over the
appeal notwithstanding § 1447(d).
In addition to rejecting the argument that the FSIA
was an implied exception to the statutory bar on
appellate review of remand orders in § 1447(d), the
court reviewed the application of the bar to the
remand order at issue. And in the course of its opin-
ion, the court provided several insights about the
availability of appellate review of remand orders.
To fully understand these issues, one must go back
to the court's path-breaking 1976 decision in
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336 (1976), in which it held for the first time that
remand orders are sometimes subject to appellate
review. The district court had remanded a removed
diversity case because of its backlog. In permitting
appellate review, the Thermtron Court found that the
reason given for the remand was not within 28 U.S.C.
§1447(c), which, at the time, permitted the remand of
cases "removed improvidently and without jurisdic-
tion." Reading §1447(c) and § 1447(d) "in pari mate-
ria," the court limited the bar on appellate review to
remands based on § 1447(c). And because a remand
based on a crowded docket was not authorized by §
1447(c), the court held that the remand order was
appealable. Subsequently, the court read Thermtron
broadly to permit appellate review of remand orders in
cases involving the discretionary remand of pendent
(now supplemental) state law claims, see Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), and
the remand of cases based on abstention. See
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
There are five insights suggested by the Powerex
Court's interpretation of § 1447(d).
First, the court clearly held that the bar on appellate
review of remand orders based on the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is not conditioned on an absence of
jurisdiction at the time of the removal. Construing lit-
erally the text of § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."), the
court held that remands were proper anytime the lack
of subject matter jurisdiction became apparent.
Second, to avoid the bar on appellate review, the
subsidiary argued that a decision on the merits by the
district court preceded the remand and was review-
able under City of Waco v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934), but the court (as it
had done last year in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust,
126 S.Ct. 2145 (2006)) construed Waco narrowly, per-
haps in an effort to curtail what appears to be an
emerging collateral order exception to § 1447(d).
Third, to treat the remand order as appealable, the
continued on page 40
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supreme court
subsidiary sought to characterize it as a discretionary
remand of a supplemental state law claim. The court,
however, ruled that the only "plausible" explanation of
the district court's remand was that it was jurisdiction-
al. In so ruling, the court noted that it had never
passed on whether the discretionary remand of supple-
mental claims was jurisdictional, thus suggesting that
the appealability of so-called Cohill remands of supple-
mental claims was an open issue and casting doubt on
an unbroken line of lower court decisions permitting
appellate review of such discretionary remands.
Fourth, the court made clear that courts of appeals
do not have free rein to determine the true basis of
remand orders. The author of the court's opinion,
Justice Scalia, noted that he (along with Justice Thomas)
would treat any remand purporting to rest on jurisdic-
tional grounds as not subject to appellate review under §
1447(d), but the full court would not go that far. Thus,
the court held that any remand resting upon a ground
"that is colorably characterized as subject-matter juris-
dictional" is insulated from appellate review.
Finally, the case suggests the basis for a possible re-
examination of the holding in Thermtron permitting
the appeal of remand orders not based on § 1447(c).
Though not addressed by the court, the argument was
made that Thermtron should be overruled or narrowly
construed because it was either wrongly decided or
because intervening statutory changes in §1447(c)
deprived the case of its continuing viability.
Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, the court
in Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 127 S.CL
2301 (2007), construed the federal officer removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), to prevent removal by a
cigarette manufacturer that tested and advertised the
tar and nicotine levels in its cigarettes pursuant to
standards required by the federal government. In so
ruling, the court found that the manufacturer was not
acting as a federal officer under the terms of the
statute and thus could not remove a state court decep-
tive advertising claim. Watson does not change the
law, but a contrary decision had the potential of
broadly opening the federal courts to removal by reg-
ulated industries that cannot make effective complete
preemption arguments. 1
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